The study is based on three main premises in its attempt to understand the Taliban movement's political project; the first, the fact that Taliban's entry into the world of politics was spontaneous after its control of power in Kabul and was not preceded by any academic theoretical study or political ideology from the Taliban leaders; the second, the fact that there was no significant change in the core of the movement’s project, which is to adhere to the independence and Islamic nature of Afghanistan, but Taliban has become more aware of regional and global political reality and has developed its performance and tools in dealing with it; and the third, is the fact that there was evident change in the movement's policy with respect to the social and media aspects.
The waning of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the field of ground fighting, the fall of its strongholds in Iraq and Syria, and the death of most of its leaders are not the only manifestations of a crisis that is ravaging the ranks of the militant organization and threatening its existence. In fact, the cracking in ISIS ideological structure and the sharp division among its leaders, Sharia theorists, preachers and soldiers is the most prominent manifestation of this crisis, especially, that this division was not due to different jurisprudential, strategic or organizational stances or views, but it was due to a conflict in ideological and methodological convictions.
The study of the tactic of the “lone wolf” within the jihadist state in isolation from the general context of this phenomenon may lead to false conclusions; therefore, a careful understanding of this term requires profound anatomy, including exploration of its background and historical roots and discussing the linguistic controversy around it among researchers. The paper concludes that despite all the weaknesses and modest results of the ‘lone wolf’ tactic, in light of its high cost, the jihadist lone wolf attacks pose an unavoidable threat, whether due to the increasing number of targeted countries from the 1990s until the new millennium, or the number of victims that are killed or injured as a result of lone wolf attacks.
In light of the pursuit of some resistance groups, such as Hezbollah of Lebanon, to achieve additional goals beyond their primary role, their weapons and agendas have become a problem for regional and local parties. Hezbollah does not hesitate to fight battles against people in its own country or in the neighboring countries. What are the justifications for such acts? What are the functional roles played by Hezbollah through participation in these battles?
The study starts from the fact that the four known domains of the traditional armed confrontations between countries (land, sea, air, and space) are no longer alone on the international scene, with the emergence of a fifth domain of confrontation, namely, the cyberspace, where cyber war is expected to be the dominant feature, if not the main feature of future wars in the twenty-first century. The danger of Internet and network wars lies in the fact that the world is becoming more and more dependent on Cyberspace, especially in the military, banking and governmental information infrastructures as well as public and private institutions and companies. The interest of world countries, especially the developed ones, in the fifth domain, the cyberspace, especially in establishing armies capable of defending vital State institutions, makes the fifth domain occupy a large part of the countries’ policies and in their future strategies.
The study addresses militarization of the education sector in Egypt, which began with the armed forces’ establishment of private schools and the military medical school, and the technological school; in addition to militarization of the Ministry of Education’s leading positions, supplying school student meals, and supervising the Cairo University Hostel’s kitchens by the armed forces’ national service sector. Meanwhile, the Armed Forces Engineering Authority (AFEA) has supervised construction of Japanese schools, in addition to AFEA’s building of 257 model schools with a total of 3520 educational classes in 18 governorates. Also, AFEA is now building 225 schools for the educational building authority, including 98 schools in Upper Egyptian governorates. AFEA has also constructed 100 schools with a total of 1668 classes in 17 governorates, funded by the United Arab Emirates.
Since the launch of Vision 2030 more than three years ago, controversy has escalated over the fate of the “transitional phase” that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is going through. While some argue that the transitional phase will end with implementation of Vision 2030 despite the difficulties and challenges facing it, which means success in formulating “public policies” on sound foundations, leading to the solution / reduction of crises in the country. However, others argue that Vision 2030 is not qualitatively new for the overall policy-making process in Saudi Arabia, that remains governed by a set of structural determinants / constraints, which in turn reflects the regime crises, whether inherited from previous eras or emerging during the reign of King Salman.
This paper addresses the founding roots of violent extremism and terrorism in the Islamic world, based on the ideas that Malik bin Nabi found in his books, in attempt to prove the hypothesis that: There is a direct relationship between social sciences and the phenomenon of violent extremism. The more the impact of social sciences prevails in a society, the less its members are likely to embrace or practice extremism, and vice versa. The paper also attempts to answer the following questions: